to gain access to information on a bomb planted by Troy. But Troy regains consciousness and undergoes the same surgical procedure in order to supplant Archer both in his family and job. For most of the film, we see Travolta's physique/body and have to believe that he is in fact Troy, whose personality and mannerisms have been imprinted in our memory by Cage's characterization and acting at the beginning of the film. Furthermore, throughout the film, we have to remember and modify our perception accordingly so that when being Troy, Travolta tries to simulate Archer's responsible tormented personality in order not to be exposed. The same multi-effort is required from us when viewing Cage as Archer.
Viewing the two actors (stars) while having to imagine the character swap (breaching the match between body/actor and character) necessarily involves tampering with fantasy. To understand this, we need to first explain the importance of casting in regard to fantasy.
Casting establishes a bond between the character, the actor's body and persona, and the spectator's fantasy. In classical and thereafter mainstream cinema, especially as practiced in the star system, it has become a vessel through which the image is manipulated to meet spectators' expectations:
Classical Hollywood star system engineered a correspondence between star and role that was archetypally embodied in Clark Gable's casting as Rhett Butler in Gone with the Wind ( [Victor Fleming,] 1939 ). At the time of the movie production, and ever since, it has seemed impossible to imagine the part being played by anyone else. (Maltby, 1995, p. 252) Unlike theater and opera, where it is less of a medium prerequisite, in cinema, because of its unique devices (mainly the close-up), the body and persona of the actor matches in more than one way the character, aspiring to comply with what the spectator's fantasy might be in regard to this embodiment on screen. 1 Behind the wish to achieve utmost correspondence between casting and roles is an attempt to guess what the Other (the audience) wants in relation to the embodiment of characters by actors. "What does the Other want from me, Che vuoi?" (Lacan, 1966, p. 690) , is the fundamental question of the subject in relation to the Other's enigmatic desire. 2 The answer given by the subject is a fantasy scene -a defense against castration. 3 'Perfect' casting in this context means a match between the actor's body and persona and the character s/he embodies on screen, onto which spectators' fantasies are projected. This is casting as an immobile visual image, meant to stop or avoid showing a traumatic scene. It is in this respect that the specular, a trait shared by film and fantasy, is manipulated to create identification with characters, their motivations and desires, masking possible fissures or schisms on other levels. 4 Therefore, breaching the match between body/actor and character necessarily involves tampering with the realm of fantasy.
Body-character breach and the return of the repressed
The spectatorial crisis in body-character breach films involves two intertwined levels: cognitive and psychoanalytic. The first relates to the viewer's perception and modes of processing data pertaining to the initial characterization of the films' protagonists as embodied by specific actors, which are being challenged. The second relates to the interrelations of conscious/unconscious in fantasy, configured in a structure of opposition.
For example, in Face-Off, in their first encounter after the swap, we see Archer/Cage in prison as Troy. Troy/Travolta enters his cell saying: "You're good-looking, you're hot; it's like looking in the mirror . . . only not." Archer/Cage is shocked when he realizes that his opponent has taken his face, identity, and position, destroying all evidence of their true identities. Travolta/Troy gleefully declares, as he leaves the beleaguered Cage/ Archer to rot in prison in his stead: "I got a government job to abuse and a lonely wife to fuck . . . Oh, did I say that? I'm sorry . . . to make love to!" The scene is shot in circular camera movements, immuring the two in an infrangible mirror positioning, conveying a structure of opposition while evincing the similarity deriving from the position switch highlighted by the shot/reverse-shot editing and the close-ups. In terms of spectatorship, the bond between character and actor expected to be maintained is the one established at the beginning of the film: Cage (as Troy) playing a psychopath; Travolta (as Archer) playing a conscientious FBI agent. Breaching this bond forces the spectator to imagine the swap in terms of oppositions (Travolta as a sadistic, gleeful psychopath; Cage as responsible and 3 In Lacanian psychoanalysis the subject of the symbolic order -the order of speech (the field of the Other, from which it emerges) and the unconscious -is split, divided, i.e. castrated. Castration is conflated with lack and ineluctably related to the lack in the Other, starting with the child's first perception that the m/Other is lacking. Castration is impossible to accept entirely. Lacan identifies three distinct yet non-rigid clinical structures defining the subject's stance vis-a-vis castration: the neurotic ('normal') is characterized by repression of awareness of castration; the perverse by its disavowal; and the psychotic by its foreclosure. Fantasy is a mechanism by which the neurotic subject will never cease to seek a defense against castration (Evans, 2001, p. 23) . 4 We relate here only to the film's visual trajectory, but in fact sound plays an important role in this formula. The actor's voice is no less important than her/his physique. This is magnificently exemplified in Singing in the Rain (Gene Kelly and Stanley Donen, 1952) in Lina Lemont's character (Jean Hagen). The advent of sound (with which the film deals) ruins her career and stardom (as was the case with many actors and stars in Hollywood) because her voice is childishly squeaky and vulgar. This undermines the spectators' (in the diegesis) fantasy created in relation to the romantic, aristocratic, greater than life characters that she embodied on (the silent) screen, as well as her (off-screen) persona. tormented). This is the first instance of tampering with fantasy as a defense against castration.
The body-character breach device has many manifestations, mostly in mainstream cinema, and is always characterized by a structure of opposition, as evident in the following taxonomy. The taxonomy also comprises mainstream films that are considered highly artistic and 'counter-cinema' (films that subvert the classical language of cinema).
1 Body-Switch. This is the most salient film category of body-character breach, mostly comprised of comedies. As explained in the example of the action drama Face/Off, in this category we have the co-presence of two swapped bodies, each containing two opposite characters (good/evil; young/old; female/male; married/single; active/passive, and so on David Fincher, 1999) , which deals with a mental transformation. Here we supposedly have two characters (Jack and Tyler) played by two actors (Edward Norton and Brad Pitt). At the end of the film, they turn out to be one character (Jack/Norton) who has undergone a psychic transformation. The oppositions are manifested by the co-presence of the two actors all through the film. The perceptual crisis indeed arises at the end, when we realize that what we have seen is really one (split) character, Jack/Norton, Tyler/Pitt having been but a figment of his imagination. Hence, we have to retroactively modify our impressions and perceptions. 4 Multiple-Body Character. Here the main character is played by one or more actors (one character, multiple bodies). The oppositions are manifested in the difference between the physique and attributes (sensual/apathetic, old/young, black/white, tall/short, male/female, and so on) of the actors who play the main character. The following are three examples that belong to counter-cinema: In Cet obscure object du d esir (Luis Buñuel, 1977) , the female part is played by two actresses; in 6 Each time this happens (in particular when Malkovich's body is taken over by Craig/Cusack), we have to struggle with having to disregard Malkovich's physique and persona and attribute his behavior, physical changes, gesticulations, and so on, to another character. The oppositions here address sex (male/female), gender (femininity/masculinity), fame/lack of recognition, and sexual orientation (straight/gay). In The Host (Andrew Niccol, 2013), Saoirse Ronen plays the character of resistance fighter Melanie whose body is forced to host an invading alien named Wanda. Wanda is a gentle and peace-seeking creature (outside Melanie's body she resembles a jellyfish) who becomes aware of the agony her kind inflicts on human beings who are forced to host them. For most of the film, Melanie is made present via her voice, while talking with Wanda. Their dialogues are rendered in voice-over. The actress's body represents Wanda's character, while the voice-over expresses the conflict between her and Melanie. Thus the body hosts two characters (aggressive fighter Melanie and the non-aggressive Wanda) in conflict.
The function of the structure of opposition in body-character breach films is to unmask the mechanism of desire in the dialectic of desire/fantasy. By hindering that which creates an ideal fantasy object whose task is to conceal the lack in the Other through casting, body-character breach films expose the double nature of fantasy -conscious/unconscious. The scripted scenarios of the films' plots enable the characters to gain access to the Other's desire (to learn what the other character wants from them in their capacity of embodying the Other) and acquire her/his privileges: the young get to be older, black get to be white, female characters get to be male, and vice versa. For example, in the third remake of Freaky Friday (Mark S. Waters, 2003) , when in her daughter's body, the mother (initially played by Jamie Lee Curtis) not only gets to control her daughter's looks and life while her own body gets to be young in style and manner, but also to better understand her daughter's desires (her wish to become a musician). The daughter (initially played by Lindsay Lohan) has free access to the mother's credit cards and she learns how to feel more at ease with the boy she is secretly in love with, but she also comes to understand her mother's desire that she get along with her future stepfather.
If we look at what the characters represent and at the narrative closure in body-character breach films, we may safely contend that they promote values such as heterosexual relations within an organic family, the restoration of an existing order, a world in which all evil is destroyed and good prevails. However, the films' power of attraction, if not seduction, lies not in their ideology, but in a fantasy shared by all humans -gaining access to the Other's desire.
The realization of the fantasy to gain access to the enigmatic desire of the Other, to be the all-knowing, all-enjoying Other, is precisely what is undermined in these films, when they suggest that such a realization might entail the materialization of incest. In Freaky Friday, such thoughts and uneasy sensations arise when facing the fact that a marriage is about to materialize between the daughter (in the mother's body) and her future stepfather. Our uneasiness is increased by displaying first the daughter's horrified gaze (in the mother's body), and later, as the wedding is approaching, the mother's dread (in the daughter's body) as well.
A variation of this scenario centers on the real daughter seen in the body of actress Jamie Lee Curtis having a good time with the boy she is in love with. All the other characters think the 50 year-old mother, about to remarry, is flirting with a teenager. Her fianc e (Mark Harmon) finds it difficult to follow the reckless behavior of his wife-to-be, as well as the unexplained control her teenage daughter suddenly has over her. In his bewilderment (for example, when he asks "Am I supposed to follow this"?) he represents the spectator. Similarly, the young character of the son and brother (Ryan Malgarini) is not only puzzled by what he believes to be his mother's behavior, but also literally repulsed (his reaction is shown in close-up) when he sees her bottom, covered with a thong, sticking out from her pants.
In Big, we cannot easily dismiss the idea that 12 year-old Josh, in the body of a grown-up, is in fact having sex with a fellow worker, Susan (Elizabeth Perkins), who could almost be his mother. This eerie feeling is confirmed by Susan's expression in the last scene of the film, when she witnesses Josh's big body shrinking to its adolescent size, going back to his original body and to his mother. In Chances Are, Alex's memories of his previous life as Louie return after he becomes romantically involved with Miranda (Mary Stuart Masterson), the daughter whom he never got to meet in his previous life/ body. Birth, in which 10 year-old Sean lies about his being the reincarnation of Anna's dead husband, evinces what all reincarnation films bring to the surface. For example, in a scene in which Anna is taking a bath, Sean comes in, undresses calmly, and sits in the tub opposite her. Shocked, Anna asks him what he is doing, to which he replies casually: "I am looking at my wife." The image of the two taking a bath together makes us squirm in our chairs because it renders visible both the seduction fantasy and the primal scene.
In Transamerica, a week before her sex change operation, Bree discovers that she is the father of a 17 year-old boy named Toby (Kevin Zegers). Transamerica is a road film, which includes a last stop at Bree's unconventional home. Forced by her analyst (Elizabeth Peña) to confront her past, she agrees to meet Toby and the two get acquainted during a long ride to Los Angeles. The latter develops amorous feelings for her. One night as they prepare to turn in, Toby makes a pass at Bree, which forces her to tell him that she is in fact his father. Toby's horrified, violent reaction is connected to the fact that he almost slept with his father, rather than to the fact that Bree is a transsexual, which he has known and sympathized with for some time.
In Face/Off, the horrifying gaze is displayed very early in the film, in the prison scene afore mentioned, suggesting that Travolta/Archer's decision to assume Troy's position by literally taking his face might be a point of no return. Cage/Archer is terrified when he realizes that the swap might be irreversible (Travolta/Troy does not display such a concern, not because he momentarily has the upper hand in the battle between good and evil, but mainly because he is a psychopath, for whom the symbolic law does not really apply). The film thus creates an affect of apprehension, reinforced later, when watching Travolta seductively working his charms on 'his' daughter. The onus of the horror of incest in such scenes is on the spectator. Our knowledge of the fact that Travolta's body is occupied by Troy's character (not the real father) does not help preclude the incest scenario conveyed by the image of Travolta's body seductively approaching 'his' daughter.
The body-swap here, as many other forms of body-character breach, exceeds physical changes that actors go through in films problematizing the relation of actor-character. Counter-cinema is known for its radical employment of stars or actors using costumes and makeup, or even one actor for more than one role, but they do not have the same traumatic effect as body-character breach films. Audiences need to make certain adjustments regarding their expectations without being thrust into the heart of trauma. For example, in Jean-Luc Godard's Le M epris (1963), French sex symbol (star) Brigitte Bardot, famous for her long blond hair, puts on a short black wig (so she resembles Anna Karina -a film star at the time and Godard's wife), resisting the viewers' expectations to watch the blond Bardot. In La Strategia del Ragno (Bernardo Bertolucci, 1972) , the trauma is somewhat present through the treatment of the characters of the son and father being played by the same actor (Giulio Brogi), as well as bearing the same name (Athos Magnani). In Dr. Strangelove (Stanley Kubrick, 1964), Peter Sellers plays three different characters. In David Lynch's Lost Highway (1997) and Mulholland Drive (2001), both known for their use of the dream/fantasy structure, we have one actress playing two different characters.
Classical and mainstream films have also experimented, to different degrees, with breaching the links between body/actor-character: from Charles Chaplin playing two polar characters in the Great Dictator (Chaplin, 1940) to Alec Guinness playing eight different characters in Kind Hearts and Coronets (Robert Hamer, 1949) and Peter Sellers playing three different characters in The Mouse That Roared (Jack Arnold, 1959), or different actors playing the same character in film sequels, such as James Bond over a period of over 50 years. We may add to this list cross-dressing, masquerading, passing, and so on. In the latter case, although the characters undergo a process of change, the viewer is not confronted with the threat of the materialization of an unconscious fantasy, which is related to the materiality of the body, conveying the traumatic aspect of the real. Mainstream cinema, subjectivization, and rhetorical strategies
In her discussion of fantasy and spectatorship, Teresa De Lauretis (1994) addresses the question of a particular film's failure to engage a spectator in its fantasy, making a significant distinction between subjectivity and subjecthood. While the first term refers to the realm of psychoanalysis and the unconscious (fantasy, desire, identification, and so on), the second relates to the subject's social locations, those attributes of which s/he is conscious and aware of (sexual orientation, race, class, gender, etc.). In De Lauretis's view, it is the latter "complex subject processes [that] have more weight in a spectator acceptance of a film as ready-made fantasy" (1994, p. 129) . When dealing with fantasy we deal with an impossible separation between conscious and unconscious, and simultaneously, with early symbolization. Therefore, it is impossible to draw the line between subjectivity and subjecthood. The unconscious mechanisms of desire and fantasy have little to do with subjecthood and much to do with subjectivity: being white, black, lesbian, woman/man, or of a certain class or social status does not bear a necessary relevance to one's subjective structure in relation to lack -whether neurotic or perverse. A viewer might engage with a character and her/his motives even though s/he resists the film's overt ideology. Engagement in this case does not mean that we condone the film's ideology, but that we unconsciously understand the character's actions because all subjective structures have a common denominator (veiling castration) in relation to the dialectic of desire/fantasy (subjectivity).
Indeed, engaging with a film means engaging with the dialectic of desire/ fantasy, with an elasticity that enables the viewer to move along the axis of this dialectic, especially when confronted with unnerving images. In other words, the structure of film as fantasy reflects the structure of the double function of fantasy (to defend the subject against castration and to sustain desire).
9 Desire is what engages us with a film -what does the character want? What does the film want? Sustaining desire is the key to keep on viewing a film. But mainstream films do not stop here. They also satisfy desire by providing answers to these questions. In terms of spectatorship, these answers are constituted as a configuration of a fantasy whose task is to conceal castration. This is why we may engage with the operation of desire/fantasy not only as pertaining to neurotics, but also to perverts and psychotics (we may like them, understand their motives, sympathize with their actions, want them to succeed, and so on).
10 But can a film engage a spectator with a process of subjectivization, 11 and if so how? 9 In the neurotic, 'normal' structure the function of fantasy is not only to defend the subject against castration but also to support desire (Lacan, 1964, p. 185 Although the function of fantasy is to sustain the subject at "just the right distance from the [Other's] dangerous desire, delicately balancing the attraction and the repulsion" (Fink, 1995, p. xii) , this need for 'balance,' however, fixates the precarious subject in a position whereby s/he might become, or, indeed, becomes, a 'false being,' a 'repetitive symptom.' The function of analysis becomes thus the "overcoming of that fixation, the reconfiguring of traversing of fantasy . . . that is . . . subjectivization, a process of making 'one's own' something that was formerly alien" (Fink, 1995, p. xii, italics in the original). By subjectifying the Other's desire that brought the subject into the world (the cause of her/his existence), the subject assumes responsibility for her/his own fate. This is why, in analysis, according to Lacan, (1964 ) the subject's unconscious fundamental fantasy (every subject has one) must be 'traversed' (p. 273), a modification in the subject's position vis-a-vis the Other's desire has to occur.
In body-character breach films the process of subjectivization is achieved through four principal tactics: (1) identification with the protagonist's fantasy to conceal the lack in the Other (achieved through the initial casting); (2) dissolution of this fantasy (through the body-character breach); (3) rhetorical strategies in which the dissolution process is coded cinematically, revealing thus the mechanism of the double nature of fantasy (conscious/unconscious); and (4) an ethical dimension -why, rather than veiling castration, the subject's acting in conformity with her/his desire is important. We argue that mainstream films may engage the spectator with a process of subjectivization provided they comprise these four conditions.
Not all mainstream body-character breach films have the same dynamic and to the same extent, in the sense that they make unconscious scenarios (mostly incest) visible. However, they do display a high awareness of the imminent dangers of maintaining fantasy at all costs with the sole purpose of masking the lack in the Other, functioning thus as a warning directed at the viewer. The fantasy that is literally realized (by some kind of spell) is always undermined by an encounter with the Other's lack via the encounter with the traumatic real of the body.
For example, in Shallow Hal (which belongs to the body transformation category in our taxonomy), Hal (Jack Black) an 'undesirable' (to use his best friend's terminology) young man, is hypnotized into seeing all 'undesirable' women as 'desirable.' Hal thereafter meets Rosemary (Gwyneth Paltrow in a fat suit), a grossly obese woman whom only he can see as a vision of physical perfection (Gwyneth Paltrow as we all know her from other films and photographs). In contrast to Hal, we are jolted throughout the film by the many scenes in which we are visually confronted with the discrepancy between the two bodies. This tampers with a possible identification with Hal's fantasy.
This meddling is further reinforced by Hal's process of subjectivization. One day his friend undoes the spell while Hal and Rosemary are having dinner in a restaurant. Hal is first confronted with the gap between fantasy and reality when he returns to the hostess, whom he previously believed to be a delightfully pretty brunette. As it turns out, this hostess is a particularly tall, not very pretty, manly looking transvestite, wearing a black wig (identical to the pretty brunette's hairdo) and the same cute uniform as the fantasmatic character in Hal's mind. The image of the transvestite hostess (unsettling in itself, because of the blurring of the division man/woman, and campiness) is Hal's first encounter with the lack in the Other, an encounter with the radical strangeness of the Other's body.
Hal's horror is intensified when he returns to his table and his eyes meet Rosemary's obese body (shot from behind, while devouring the food on the plates). Avoiding a frontal confrontation, a panicky Hal flees from the restaurant. Later on, when Rosemary arrives at his apartment, still terrified of a confrontation, Hal smears his eyes with Vaseline and pretends to have some kind of congestive eye sickness. When he finally opens the door for her, we get a close-up of his Vaseline-smeared eyes, then a blurred static shot (Hal's point of view) of Rosemary. The shot/reverse-shot editing repeats this pattern, only this time Rosemary's shot is not static. The camera tilts down on her silhouette, conveying both Hal's desire to see her body for what it is and his horror of it.
After recovering from these encounters, Hal realizes that he is in fact in love with Rosemary's inner beauty, and goes to her house to declare his love. Upon entering, he sees a big woman and starts kissing her passionately on the lips, not realizing that she is the maid. This instance exemplifies how a fixed fantasy (here, a male fantasy in relation to women) may blind a perverse subject to the point of being unable to recognize the very fact that there is an Other (in the body of another).
12 For Hal, up to this point all 'desirable' women looked like models (in compliance with his fantasy), therefore now all fat women can be 'Rosemary' (i.e., all fat women are alike). It is only when Hal is able to associate his own desire with the specific body and personality of Rosemary in all its strangeness, as an Other, that he finally assumes responsibility for it (his desire). This marks his process of subjectivization, which in body-switch films is sealed by the characters' return to their own bodies, assuming responsibility for their own desire and fate.
Shallow Hal specifically deals with a male fantasy. Here too it is not hard to identify with the protagonist's fantasy (what man wouldn't like to be the object of desire of women looking like Gwyneth Paltrow?). This identification is broken by the traumatic encounter of the real body of the Other/ Woman followed by its ethical dimension, a lesson to be learned.
Hitchcock's Vertigo, which also belongs to the body transformation category in our taxonomy, is an artistic meta-cinematic film that does exactly what all mainstream body-character breach films do -it explains how being able to face and acknowledge the lack in the Other generates subjectivization by engaging the viewer with such a process, while cinematically explaining its mechanism. In Vertigo, we have one actress (Kim Novack) playing two characters (the blond Madeleine and the brunette Judy). The female character's transformation is achieved by makeup and clothes. As in Shallow Hal, this transformation is related to a male character's fantasy, and the 'view-behind' (seeing what the character does not) assigned to the spectator is a device against a fetishist position.
Scottie (James Stewart) is a retired detective who suffers from acrophobia, which thwarts him from preventing the fall of a fellow policeman to his death. An acquaintance, Gavin Elster (Tom Helmore), asks Scottie to follow his wife, Madeleine (Kim Novak, playing a mysterious and elusive ideal blond object of desire), for whose life he fears, claiming that she is obsessed with her grandmother's suicide. Scottie falls in love with her and Hitchcock lures us through various romantic devices (Madeleine's mysterious, fragile, elusive, ethereal characterization, as well as Scottie's fascination with this object) to identify with this love story. Scottie is eventually forced to witness Madeleine's falling to her death, unable to prevent her 'suicide' due to his vertigo. This ends the first part of the film, cinematically conveyed as a reverie. We experience loss, enhanced by Scottie's mental breakdown, as well 12 This is how literally any body might become the object of one's (realized/literalized) fantasy, such as in real situations of incest.
as by his frequenting the places that Madeleine visited, often imagining that he sees her when he does not.
One day, Scottie notices a woman resembling Madeleine, despite her vulgar appearance. He follows her and she identifies herself as Judy Barton. In a flashback of Judy, we learn that Madeleine Elster is in fact Judy, who impersonated Gavin's wife as part of a murder plot. Gavin had deliberately taken advantage of Scottie's acrophobia to substitute his wife's recently killed body in the apparent suicide jump. Here, as in Shallow Hal, it is our 'view-behind' that creates a gap between our spectatorial position and the protagonist's. Hitchcock shatters our fantasy of (re)finding the ideal object, and forces us to look into the traumatic void through the encounter with the real body of Judy (as opposed to Madeleine's fantasmatic one) long before Scottie is able to do so. This, in terms of spectatorship, marks a beginning of subjectivization.
Our knowledge of two characters owning the same body (that of Kim Novack) creates an image of the uncanny in the Freudian sense (1919b).
13
Every time we look at Judy, we see both characters in one body.
14 Hitchcock enhances this feeling in the scene in which Judy comes out of the hair salon looking almost like Madeleine. She is wearing Madeleine's outfit and has her hair color, but still maintains her own hairdo and mannerisms. The strange image of two characters united in one body has a double role: it reflects simultaneously the traumatic gap and its veiling.
Oblivious of the information with which the viewer is entrusted, Scottie, obsessed with Madeleine, coerces Judy into a makeover. Here two positions become viable in terms of spectatorship, answering the question "What do I want?" (In this case, overlapping with the question "What does the film want from me?") -do I want Scottie to succeed or fail in his endeavors to resuscitate Madeleine? Scottie's obsession marks a fetishistic position, a perverse one, in regard to the lack in the Other. In the opening sequence, he is already characterized by a fear of castration, expressed in his acrophobia. This is enhanced by the trauma of slipping down a roof during a chase, causing the death of his fellow policeman. When looking down, the abyss 13 Freud's definition of the uncanny (1919b, pp. 219-52) as a feeling or sensation instilled in the reader of fictional literature (aesthetics) centers on two opposites (unheimlich/heimlich) that contain each other's qualities, depending on the circumstances (in body-character breach films the realistic dimension combined with the fantastic one enhances the feeling of uncanniness). Hence, 'the uncanny' derives its horrifying characteristic from its double nature, its strangeness and menacing force being an inherent aspect of the familiar (in body-character breach films the uncanniness derives first from the fact that the character is displaced to another body). In E.T.A. Hoffmann's short story, 'The Sandman,' which Freud analyzes, there are many manifestations of the double (the splitting of one character into two, the one reflecting the other; reality/the fantastic; human/inhuman, robot-puppet; life/death; normalcy/madness; science/mysticism). The crux of the uncanny as something repressed that resurfaces is the fear of castration, exemplified in 'The Sandman' by the face without eyes motif. What is repressed (especially of a sexual nature) and must be regulated through hiding it from consciousness as well as from the public eye, returns in a threatening form, ridden with oedipal guilt, fearing symbolic castration as punishment for deviating from societal norms. Certain images, objects or individuals onto which we project our own repressed impulses become thus uncanny. 14 Discussions of the uncanny or the double function of Madeleine/Judy in Vertigo are quite ample. See, for example, Barnett (2007); Bronfen (1993) ; Gabbard (1998); Huntjens (2003); and Modleski (1988) . Of particular interest in relation to fantasy is Slavoj Zi zek's (1991) discussion of how the sublime object loses its power of fascination for the subject. whose sight Scottie cannot endure (hence the vertigo) represents an encounter with the real: "Dangling helplessly in space from a gutter, Scottie comes face to face with a deadly void, the incarnation of the Lacanian real" (Manlove, 2007, p. 92) . "Madeleine" becomes for Scottie a fetish, a veil to castration. The loss of this object enhances his trauma. This is why when he meets Judy he cannot stand her sight and compulsively makes her over into Madeleine.
'I want Scottie to succeed' would thus mean occupying a fetishistic/perverse position, equally maintained by identifying with Judy's desire to be the Other's object-cause of desire. But a viewer might revolt against Scottie's sadistic treatment of her. The latter position would be a more critical (neurotic) one, beginning with our knowledge of who 'Madeleine' really is. For both Scottie and us, Madeleine's death is an experience of loss. However, as soon as we learn that Madeleine is Judy, although we move into the realm of trauma, nevertheless, identifying here with Scottie's insistence to make Judy over would run the risk of experiencing the inert aspect of fetishism. Scottie's violent reaction (expressing his traumatic encounter) upon realizing what we have known and experienced for some time, intensifies the wake-up call directed at us. The second death (of Judy), which, for Scottie, also means the death of fetishism (the transition from a pervert to a neurotic position), marks, for both Scottie and us, another traumatic encounter with the void.
Another rhetorical device that keeps pulling us in the direction of a neurotic position is Scottie's devoted female friend (of whose love he remains oblivious all through), Midge (Barbara Bel Geddes). Midge represents a neurotic (normal) subject position. She is tragically aware of Scottie's obsession, and one day she shows him a painting she did. Scottie is deeply hurt and horrified when he discovers that it is a reproduction in which Midge has substituted Madeleine's grandmother's face (as a young woman) with her own plain-looking face, wearing a heavy pair of spectacles. This uncanny reproduction (like his severed head in his dream) deeply upsets Scottie. For us, it functions as a 'tutor code. ' One of the questions arising in Vertigo is cinema's role in relation to its double nature (traumatic/pacifying). In Face/Off, this question arises when, at the beginning of the film, we see a close shot of Archer/Travolta's severed face, like a mask, floating in liquid. This refers to one of the most rudimentary devices in cinema: the close-up (a face severed from its body), which creates pleasure and identification (as a fetishistic object), as well as anxiety and displeasure (as a symbol of castration). 15 Mainstream cinema has the advantage of engaging the viewer with a subjectivization process in relation to cinema's innate uncanniness by maintaining these four conditions: identification with the fantasy to do away with lack, its dissolution, rhetorical strategies that either explain the subjectivization process (while maintaining our unconscious engagement with the film) or preclude a fetishistic position, and an ethical dimension. 15 See, for example, Pascal Bonitzer's (1992) discussion of the close-up as a severed head in relation to desire and the gaze (p. 18). his mother's desire, unable to mourn the loss of the phallus and follow the path of his own desire.
In body-character breach films, the characters are trapped in the Other's body/desire, realizing later (like Hamlet, at the end of the play) the dangers entailed. The spectators witness the many potentially transgressive, taboo-breaking, incestuous situations and feel troubled or horrified at the character's futile attempts to veil the lack in the Other. Many of these films disguise some of this horror in the mode of comedy.
Similar to the play-within-the-play in Hamlet, these transgressive scenes function as mise-en-abyme. By explaining film's unique ontology as a visual and specular form by first appeasing castration and then bringing to the surface that which is barred from consciousness, body-character breach films compel us to examine our position in relation to our fundamental (unconscious) fantasy; they guide us into modifying this position. In fact, they infer that in mainstream cinema, casting might be the principal locus to which a cinematic image and the spectator's reaction are anchored in one shared fantasmatic image.
